The decomposition of the redistributive effect of an income tax into vertical, horizontal and reranking contributions according to the model of Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) , henceforth AJL, is revisited. When close equals groups are used, rather than the exact equals groups upon which the model is predicated, problems arise. A new measurement system is proposed, in which three distinct forms of reranking are disentangled and the vertical and horizontal contributions are redefined. Other approaches to measuring equity in tax systems are set in context. Findings are applied to Croatian data, and recommendations for users of the AJL methodology are given.
Introduction
The decomposition of the redistributive effect of an income tax system into vertical, horizontal and reranking components has been much studied of late. A sequence of related papers, those of Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) , , and Aronson, Lambert and Trippeer (1999) lay out the appropriate (Gini-based) measurement theory for a model in which the pre-tax income distribution can be partitioned into exact pre-tax equals groups, and the tax system does not rerank such groups, nor does it (obviously) rerank the members within any group, in the transition from pre-tax to post-tax income. The methodology has, though, usually been applied in the context of close equals groups. See, for example, Wagstaff et al. (1999) and, most recently, Hyun and Lim (2005) .
The disparity between the model of the Aronson et al. papers and the domain in which the result is commonly applied is accounted for by the lack (or sparseness) of exact equals in typical real-world data sets, notwithstanding that the typical tax system does cause both rank reversals and the unequal treatment of equals (the former in most samples and the latter at the population level if not in one's sample). In van der Ven, Creedy and Lambert (2001) it is shown that an arbitrary specification of close equals groups can lead to misleading results, and a procedure to define the close equals groups optimally in terms of class width is suggested. Problems with the decomposition remain, though, as these authors note, "when reranking occurs within groups of close equals or if entire groups are reranked" (ibid., p. 385). Unfortunately these forms of reranking are all too common in typical microdata.
The prevalence and implications of both reranking within close equals groups and reranking of entire close equals groups had not occurred to one of us (Lambert, during the writing of the Aronson et al papers), but became obvious to the other (Urban) as soon as an empirical study of redistributive effect in Croatia was begun. In the present paper, we explain fully the modifications which must be made to the measurement system of the Aronson et al papers when close equals groups are invoked by the practitioner, and when he or she finds one or both of the unenvisaged forms of reranking to be present in the sample data. In the process of thus tidying things up for empirical analysts working in the area, we have also been able to finally reconcile a number of approaches to measuring equity in tax systems which co-exist in the literature but appear to offer slightly differing recipes to the practitioner (principally those of Atkinson 1980 , Plotnick 1981 and Kakwani 1984 , but with connections also to work of King 1983 and Jenkins 1994) , using a consistent theoretical framework.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we explain the three forms of reranking which a tax system can induce between and within close equals groups, using an illustrative data set. In Section 3, we carefully delineate a number of transformations between income vectors, appropriately ordered, which can be used to capture the vertical, horizontal and reranking stances of a tax system, using the hypothetical data of Section 2 to illustrate. This leads to a fully articulated measurement system, in which three distinct forms of reranking are disentangled. Moreover, the various approaches to measuring horizontal and vertical equity in tax systems in previous literature, which we have referred to above, are all accounted for, drawn together and reconciled in the new measurement system. In Section 4, we apply the findings to Croatian data, and make recommendations for future empirical studies. Section 5 concludes.
Reranking within, and of, entire close equals groups
In Table 1 , the columns X and N present simulated but realistic-looking data on pre-tax and post-tax incomes. The first thing a researcher will need to do when he or she has gathered the data is to sort both columns together, by increasing order of pre-tax income. Already here the first problem arises. It may happen that there is specific amount of income, for example a minimum wage, received by many taxpayers. In our sample this happens for income units {#6,#7,#8,#9} and {#21,#22,#23}. We will call these income units pre-tax exact equals.
How should we arrange the post-tax incomes N of pre-tax exact equals? A simple way is to sort the income units in increasing order of post-tax income within each group of pretax exact equals. This has already been done in In reality, income units having exactly the same pre-tax income as each other will form a tiny part of the sample, or may be absent. Pre-tax income is usually assessed in terms of 1/100 th of a currency unit and most taxpayers will have different pre-tax incomes. Thus, the second step will be to form artificial groups of income units which have similar incomes. We call such income units close pre-tax equals, and use bands to allocate income units to groups. In Table 1 , we have used a bandwidth of $50. The lower (upper) limit is $50 ($99.99) for the first group, $100 ($149.99), and so on. We obtain in this way six close equals groups with the following memberships: G 1 = {#1,#2,#3}, G 2 = {#4,…,#9}, G 3 = {#10,#11}, G 4 = {#12,…,#17}, G 5 = {#18,#19}, G 6 = {#20,…,#26}.
We are ready to proceed with an intuitive analysis of reranking. Column r X in Table 1 shows the pre-tax income ranking of income units. Higher income means a higher rank. Column r N shows the ranking of these same income units after the tax has been subtracted. The two scales are different and this means that the tax induces reranking. Observe the most drastic examples: the rank of income unit #19 goes down 8 points to 11 th place after tax; at the other extreme, income unit #11 moves up by 6 points to 17 th place after tax.
The process of reranking that takes us from r X to r N can be broken down into three distinct phases: within-group reranking, entire-group reranking, and a third form of reranking which we associate with the model of Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) , henceforth AJL. In the column of Table 1 labeled K 1 , the income units are ordered as in the beginning, before tax, and in the final column, labeled K 2 , they are lined up in ascending order of post-tax income. 2 We can go from K 1 to K 2 in three steps, as follows. First, note that in K 1 , the income units already fall into close equals groups, shown graphically by the boxes drawn around the groupings in that column. Now consider the following three steps, starting from K 1 :
1. Introduce reordering of income units within groups only, such that post-tax incomes increase monotonically in each group. In particular, income unit #4 moves up 4 places in G 2 . There are also changes in G 4, G 5 and G 6 but none are necessary in G 1 and G 3 By this, we obtain the column K 3 . The transition K 1 →K 3 measures within-groups reranking.
1 Spreadsheet calculators and statistical packages offer the possibility of ordering two columns together, first by one column (X), and then by the second column (N), in a single action. This must be done before going further. If the building of N were left to accident, quite arbitrary orderings of N could emerge. 2 For example, income unit #5, placed third lowest in column K 2 , has post-tax income rank r N = 3; income units #19 and #11, which have r N =11 and r N =17 respectively, appear 11 th and 17 th in column K 2 (etc).
2. Now reorder whole groups, keeping the order of income units within each group unchanged, in such a way that the mean post-tax income rises monotonically from one group to the next. In the case of our data, this necessitates G 3 and G 4 changing places, since the mean post-tax income for G 3 is 162.39 and the mean post-tax income for G 4 is only 160.45. No other changes are needed. Column K 4 is the result; the transition K 3 →K 4 represents entire-groups reranking.
3. Keeping everything else the same in K 4 , we now introduce the final change, to K 2 , which is of a new kind, in that some income units 'jump' or escape from their original group to take up new positions elsewhere. Now all income units are now lined up in ascending order of their post-tax income, regardless of the group memberships. This final transition, from K 4 to K 2 , which involves shuffles of members across groups into their post-tax positions, is the only type of reranking that can take place within the confines of AJL's tax model. We will therefore say that the transition K 4 →K 2 describes AJL reranking.
In summary, we have identified three phases of reranking here. The original (pretax) ranking r X is that of column K 1 . The post-tax ranking r N is that of column K 2 . Three types of reranking, respectively the within-groups, entire-groups and AJL forms of reranking, are captured by the three steps of the sequence which took us from K 1 to K 2 :
All of these stages are involved in the redistributive process, as we shall shortly explain in greater detail.
Measurement system
In what follows we allude repeatedly to the illustrative data of Table 1 above, but our arguments will apply equally to any data set and should be sufficient to guide the analyst in possession of real-world microdata.
First, we order the income units by pre-tax income level and, among exact pre-tax equals, by post-tax income level. Call this ordering criterion O 1 . We used this ordering in Table 1 above to define the columns X, N and K 1 . Table 2 below also contains this income data, as the two columns X and N 1 . The column for X is non-decreasing; the Lorenz curve for pre-tax income, call it L X , is computed using this ordering.
[ Table 2 about here] For each row of Table 2 , the N 1 -value is the actual post-tax income of a person with pretax income given by the X-value at the start of that row. The vector N 1 is not necessarily increasing. Indeed, it will exhibit decreases precisely when the tax system causes reranking (i.e. if, as in this data set, there are people with higher pre-tax income and lower post-tax income than others). Let C 1 be the post-tax concentration curve with respect to the ordering O 1 . C 1 will not equal the post-tax Lorenz curve if N 1 is not increasing. Kakwani (1984) recognized this. For him, the transformation L X C 1 determined the vertical characteristic of the tax system (see also Kakwani, 1986, p. 83-84 on this). For other quite different conceptions of the vertical action of the tax system, see on.
Let O 2 be the ordering of income units by post-tax income level (shown in column K 2 of Table 1 ). N 2 , the increasing vector of post-tax incomes so ordered, is shown as a column in Table 2 , and L N is the Lorenz curve for post-tax incomes, computed from N 2 . However, to the extent that the tax system causes any reranking, there are N 2 -values which do not correspond to the X-values at the start of the relevant rows. The transition N 1 N 2 unscrambles all reranking caused by the tax system. Atkinson (1980) , Plotnick (1981) and Kakwani (1984 Kakwani ( , 1986 measure this reranking, which we call APK-reranking in the sequel, by the transition C 1 L N .
The mapping X N 2 , associating each N 2 -value with the X-value at the start of the same row in Table 2 , assigns to people at various positions in the pre-tax income parade the post-tax income value appearing at that same position in the post-tax parade. This mapping features in the work of King (1983) and Jenkins (1988 Jenkins ( , 1994 , who characterize horizontal inequity by the 'distance' (somehow defined) between N 2 and N 1 . See also Jenkins and Lambert (1999) and Lambert (2001, p. 247 ) on this.
Next, the analyst must select close pre-tax equals groups. In the case of the data in Table  2 , we have used income ranges $50-$99.99, $100-$149. 99, $150-$199.99, $200-$249.99, $250-$299.99, $300-$349.99 to define the groups. Obviously the pre-tax means are increasing from each group to the next. Now order the income units by post-tax income within each group, and order the groups by the pre-tax group means; call this ordering criterion O 3 . Column K 3 of Table 1 shows the income units ordered according to criterion O 3 . Table 2 shows the post-tax income vector as N 3 for this situation; C 3 is the concentration curve for post-tax income according to the ordering O 3 . N 3 will differ from N 1 (and C 3 from C 1 ) to the extent that, as in our data set, within any close equals group there are people with higher pre-tax income and lower post-tax income than others in that group. The transformation N 1 N 3 unscrambles such rerankings within groups. But N 3 is not itself an increasing vector if, again as here, there are people in lower pre-tax income ranges [close equals groups] who have higher post-tax incomes than others in higher pre-tax income ranges [close equals groups]. The transition C 1 C 3 measures (only) the within-group reranking caused by the tax system; it does not unscramble whole-group rerankings. Now consider the ordering, call it O 4 , in which the groups are lined up in order of their post-tax means, and within the groups, the income units are ordered by their post-tax incomes. Within each close equals group, the ordering of persons is the same as for O 3 , but the groups come in a different order to the extent that the tax system reranks entire groups [making people in a close equals group with a lower pre-tax mean on average better off than their counterparts in a close equals group with a higher pre-tax mean]. In this situation, overlap can be seen between the post-tax income ranges occupied by the respective pre-tax close equals groups. In Table 1 , column K 4 shows the income units ordered in this way. Let N 4 be the post-tax income vector so ordered, and let C 4 be the concentration curve for post-tax income with respect to O 4 . As shown in Lambert and Aronson (1993) , the degree of such overlap is measurable on the Lorenz diagram by the transition C 4 L N , and in the decomposition of the post-tax Gini coefficient across pretax equals groups, by the residual term.
In Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) , henceforth AJL, the degree of tax-induced overlap of the post-tax income ranges of distinct pre-tax equals groups was measured by this residual, and characterized as a form of reranking, and shown to be a negative component in the redistributive effect of the tax system (itself measured by the transformation L X L N ). We call the transition C 4 L N the AJL-reranking of the tax system in all that follows.
Before moving on to the vertical and horizontal effects of the tax system, consider the transformation N 3 N 4 . Post-tax income values are ordered from smallest to largest within each close equals group in both vectors, but the groups themselves are re-ordered in this transformation (by post-tax mean instead of pre-tax mean). We could capture by the transformation C 3 C 4 the effect of the tax system in reranking entire groups (having purged already within-group rerankings), but overlap clearly remains. AJL did not note the possibility that a tax system might engender entire-group reranking, because their model admitted only exact equals groups and they assumed that the tax on average had a marginal rate of less than unity (however, see their footnote 1, page 264).
AJL decompose the redistributive effect of the tax system into vertical, horizontal and AJL-reranking components, in a model in which the population is partitioned into exact equals groups and the post-tax income on average in an equals group increases with pretax income level (i.e. from one equals group to the next adjacent one). The vertical effect in this model measures, as a transformation in the Lorenz diagram, the effect of the tax on average across such groups. The horizontal effect captures the unequal tax treatment of exact equals, also as a transformation in the Lorenz diagram. To obtain these two transformations, an artificial post-tax income distribution is constructed in which pre-tax (exact) equals have a common post-tax income, equal to the average actual post-tax income for the group.
In the current scenario, with the population partitioned into close rather than exact equals groups, we can replicate these constructions by also computing a counterfactual post-tax income distribution, one in which the operation of the tax system within each close equals group has been smoothed, and use this smoothed distribution to express the vertical and horizontal stances of the tax system. The way to do it is to make the counterfactual tax schedule distributionally neutral within groups -proportional, that israther than equalizing the incomes of close equals, which would involve rich-to-poor redistribution within each group, thus introducing a hypothetical and quite unjustified vertical effect within groups.
This procedure accords with proposals of Camarero et al. (1993) , Pazos et al. (1995) and Lambert and Ramos (1997) , and strictly, it captures an estimate only for true classical horizontal inequity which is, of course, predicated on the tax treatment of exact equals. The horizontal measure derived from the analyst's choice of close equals group and the resultant smoothing may be negative in some circumstances, and the vertical effect correspondingly understated (see on).
Thus for each close equals group, let g be the share of total pretax income taken in tax, as shown in Table 2 . Ordering the income units according to O 1 and forming the close equals groups as before, let N 5 be the post-tax income vector that would obtain if, counterfactually, each income unit had its pretax income X reduced by the fraction g particular to its group, and denote by C 5 the concentration curve for N 5 . If whole groups are reranked by the actual tax system, they will be reranked also by the smoothed tax system (due to the way the tax rate g is constructed, group by group). Thus the transformation L X C 5 has a feature which AJL did not recognize -whole-group reranking (but again see their footnote 1, page 264) -and it measures the full vertical effect of the tax system given the close equals groups selected by the analyst.
For N 6 , which is a rearrangement of N 5 , we re-order the groups by post-tax means; within the groups, the income units take the values and order from N 5 . By this transition (N 5 N 6 ), any whole-group rerankings caused by the counterfactual smoothed tax system are unscrambled (in the same way that they were for the actual tax system by the transformation N 3 N 4 ). As then, rerankings of individuals between groups are left in place (as evidenced, for example, in the middle part of the vector N 6 ). C 6 is the corresponding concentration curve. The vertical effect of the tax system as perceived by AJL, and appropriate to their measurement system as we shall see, is realized by the transformation L X C 6 .
Let N S be the vector obtained when either N 5 or N 6 is rearranged in increasing order, and let L NS be the Lorenz curve for post-tax income induced by the counterfactual tax system, derived from N S . The redistributive effect of the counterfactual system is given by the transformation L X L NS . The APK-reranking caused by the counterfactual tax system is seen in the transformation N 5 N S (and C 5 L NS ), whilst the AJL-reranking in the counterfactual tax system is measured by the transformation N 6 N S (and C 6 L NS ).
Finally, we come to the horizontal effect of the tax system. In Jenkins and Lambert (1999) , two distinct, basic approaches to capturing the horizontal inequity (HI) in a tax system are identified and explored. Approach 1 focuses upon inequality of post-tax income among (exact) equals; approach 2 rests upon the person-by-person departures of actual post-tax incomes from those generated by a reference schedule, itself constructed counterfactually to be HI-free within equals groups. Approach 1 is typified by the methodology of AJL, whilst the work of King (1983) and Jenkins (1994) follows approach 2. the tax acts to increase inequality within close equals groups" (page 29). N 3 and N 5 , representing respectively the actual and counterfactual (smoothed) tax systems, are identical in their ordering of close equals groups, as are N 4 and N 6 . Either of the transformations C 6 C 4 and C 5 C 3 can be used to capture the pseudo-horizontal effect of the tax system; this effect does not depend on the ordering of close equals groups.
However the underlying transitions N 6 N 4 and N 5 N 3 break the link between peoples' actual and smoothed post-tax incomes, because for N 3 and N 4 , post-tax incomes have been reranked non-decreasingly within groups (compare N 3 with N 1 to see this), whilst for N 5 and N 6 the smoothed values, being derived directly from X, are (also) nondecreasing but not reranked. Hence for a person-by-person comparison of actual and smoothed post-tax incomes, the transition N 5 N 1 is appropriate. This gives rise to a second possibility for specifying the horizontal effect, namely, via the transformation C 5 C 1 . The two horizontal effects are related, as we shall see, and both can be negative, in which case the corresponding vertical effects will be understated. 4 We have now characterized a number of tax effects, by transformations between Lorenz and concentration curves, the latter constructed using various orderings of income units. Writing G for the Gini coefficient for a Lorenz curve L (hence G X , G N and G NS in the present case), and D for the equivalent index in the case of a concentration curve (hence the concentration coefficients D 1 , D 3 , D 4 , D 5 , D 6 ), we may now arrive at numerical measures of the strength of the relevant effects of the tax system, as in Table 3 below (where they are written in their order in which they were presented, and with the underlying orderings of income units also defined for convenience). by post-tax income within groups, and the groups by post-tax means
A simple example shows this rather starkly. In a population of four persons, let the pre-tax incomes be 114, 126, 194, 206 and let the corresponding post-tax values be 80, 80, 100, 100. Form two close equals groups, {114, 126} and {194,206}. The tax creates complete equality within each group. The counterfactual tax rates are g = ⅓ and g = ½ respectively, and hence the smoothed incomes become 76, 84, 97, 103. Inequality is unambiguously higher under the counterfactual tax than under the actual tax, both within each close equals group and overall. This leads to negative measures for (pseudo-)horizontal inequity, and understated vertical effects. 
TABLE 3. CONCEPTS AND MEASURES
A number of relationships stem immediately from Table 3 . First, we have:
as in Kakwani (1984 Kakwani ( , 1986 ; showing that AJL did not account for all possible reranking in their study (namely, their model did not allow for within-group reranking or entire group reranking, which are both accommodated in the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani measurement system).
Second, in respect of the counterfactual smoothed tax system, we have analogous results:
which is the analogue of (1) and (2) affirming that the AJL conception of the vertical effect of the (smoothed) tax system does not recognize any whole group reranking that may be taking place. Also, directly from the definitions in Table 3 , we have (8) H = H AJL -R WG exposing the within-group ranking difference that distinguishes H AJL from H. Finally, from (2), (3), (7) and (8) comes:
which is a decomposition of redistributive effect into vertical, horizontal and reranking components that is identical in form to AJL's (in equation (2)), but with different component measures. Naturally, (9) reduces to exactly the AJL form for a tax system such as AJL's in the case of exact equals groups and no entire group reranking.
Summarizing, our careful modeling has exposed three alternative decompositions of redistributive effect into vertical, horizontal and reranking components. Two of these come from existing literature, namely:
(1) RE = V K -R APK which is due to Kakwani (1984) and lacks a pure horizontal term, and: (2) RE = V AJL -H AJL -R AJL which extends the AJL methodology to the close equals group scenario but does not capture within-group and entire-group rerankings (if these occur). The third such decomposition: (9) RE = V -H -R APK which is new, rests upon the 'full vertical effect' and the 'type 2 horizontal effect', both of which we constructed ab initio for the close equals model. In this decomposition, as in Kakwani's, the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani measure R APK is the measure of reranking, and it captures all forms of reranking (recall (3)). Moreover, although the vertical and horizontal contributions V and H may be understated, as already explained, their difference, V-H, most certainly is not, since it equals RE -R APK which does not depend on the close equals group construction. Of course, from (1), it must be that (10) V K = V -H showing that the missing horizontal term in Kakwani's decomposition has to be netted out of his vertical contribution. In the case that H is negative (as in our example in footnote 4), V is correspondingly understated but Kakwani's V K , which combines both terms, is independent of close equals groupings. ), all of which describe facets of an actual tax system -and yet another array of measures for the counterfactual (smoothed) tax system. What is the practitioner to make of all this? Which indices should be presented to the policy analyst? Equation (9) specifies the only decomposition of redistributive effect into vertical, horizontal and reranking components which takes account of all three forms of reranking identified in Section 2 of the paper. It also rests upon vertical and horizontal effects which we constructed ab initio for the close equals model, whereas AJL's decomposition of redistributive effect, in (2), neglects important (and empirically prevalent) sources of reranking when applied in close equals group scenarios. Not only is R AJL inadequate as a measure of reranking in that setting (recall (3)), but also V AJL and H AJL are inadequate as measures of vertical and horizontal redistribution too -because, in contrast with the corresponding effects of decomposition (9), they take no account of entire-group and within-group rerankings (recall (7) and (8)). Table 4 shows the numerical values of all measures for the illustrative data of Tables 1  and 2 . For the recommended decomposition, in (9), vertical redistribution accounts for 126.7% of actual redistributive effect, with losses of 4.9% and 21.8% attributable to horizontal inequity and reranking respectively. Kakwani's decomposition, in (1), also shows a 21.8% loss of redistributive effect attributable to reranking, but this decomposition does not rely upon close equals group modeling and thereby lacks a horizontal component. For AJL's decomposition, in (2), vertical redistribution accounts for 125.6% of redistributive effect, with losses of 13.7% and 11.9% attributed to horizontal inequity and reranking respectively. The reranking effect is less for AJL because their model neglects within-group and entire-group rerankings. Indeed, from (3), AJL-reranking accounts for only 54.7% of the reranking induced by this (hypothetical) tax system. Of the remainder, 40.4% occurs within groups, and 4.9% comes from entiregroup rerankings. .057203 -.002217
TABLE 4. REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECT AND ITS VERTICAL, HORIZONTAL AND RERANKING CONTRIBUTIONS FOR THE ILLUSTRATIVE DATA OF TABLES 1 AND 2
It is important to stress that all of these results (except that of Kakwani) are conditioned by the choice of close equals groups, which in this illustrative case were defined by a $50 bandwidth. The choice of bandwidth also determines the counterfactual (smoothed) tax system (whose own characteristics for our illustration can also be found in Table 4 ). As we have pointed out, in some applications and for some choices of bandwidth, negative horizontal effects and understated vertical effects may be expected.
Finally, before turning to our Croatian data, we briefly consider the methodology used in previous empirical studies which have adapted the AJL approach to close equals groups. Typically, the vertical component of redistributive effect has been computed by some form of averaging within close equals groups, just as AJL do for the exact equals groups of their model. 
The VCL procedure is consistent with economic theory, as can be demonstrated in terms of the decompositions and of the pre-and post-tax Gini coefficients across close equals groups.
, , 8 The notation here is, perhaps, self-explanatory: the components are the 5 This approach was also adopted by Doorslaer et al. (1999) in the context of health care finances. 6 It must be said that, had H WAG been obtained directly, from the formula published in rather than as a residual, namely as
∑
, where G k,n is the Gini coefficient for post-tax income in close equals group k and a k,n is the product of that group's population share and post-tax income share, then the decomposition would have failed. See ahead. 7 The VCL approach has also been adopted in the recent paper of Wagstaff (2004) . 8 For more on the Gini decomposition in general, see Lambert and Aronson (1993) and Lambert and Decoster (2004). between-groups, within-groups and overlap terms (the first of these involving averaging, and the last being zero for the pre-tax income distribution, because of the way close equals groups are constructed). Subtracting one decomposition from the other, we arrive
) n which is VCL's equation (4) (with a minor change of notation). In this, E n = G N -D 4 = R AJL and (G B,x -G B,n ) = V VCL .
Hence H VCL = , and the decomposition
is exact when all terms are calculated directly.
9
As this discussion has shown, more than one attempt has been made in empirical literature to adapt the AJL system of measurement to the close equals group situation. Table 5 shows all of these vertical and horizontal estimates, for our illustrative dataset. We find small differences between V WAG , V VCL , V AJL and V, and small differences between H VCL and H AJL , but the H of our equation (9) differs considerably from the other horizontal measures, and H WAG is untrustworthy, as we have explained. 11 . Equation (9) is our recommended one, in which all forms of reranking are included in the reranking term, R APK , and the vertical and horizontal terms have their own rationales, arising from 9 Despite this distinction, it is nevertheless true of both the WAG and VCL procedures that, if the groups were of exact equals (so that G k,x = 0 for all k), then the counterfactual tax function would become precisely the one of AJL's model, and the respective decompositions would both reduce to AJL's. We can now understand why decomposition (11) would fail for close equals groups, were H WAG to be calculated directly.
Subtract the decomposition of G N across close equals groups from
The middle term on the right is H WAG as evaluated directly (see footnote 6), but the other two terms are certainly not V WAG and R WAG (the latter of which equals R AJL + R EG from (12)). V WAG and [G X -G B,n ] are, respectively, the redistributive effects of a tax which is lump sum within each close equals group, and one which completely equalizes the incomes of close equals. 10 Just consider the VCL decomposition of RE S for the counterfactual smoothed tax system. The "horizontal" term is H S VCL = since the smoothed tax is distributionally neutral in each close equals group. But this counterfactual tax is HI-free by construction. Hence H
, which is clearly non-zero in general, can hardly be regarded as a horizontal contribution to RE S . The "horizontal" measure H WAG fares little better. From (4), (6) and (7), 
Empirical application
As part of a research project on redistributional aspects of the Croatian personal income tax (henceforth PIT) and social security contribution (henceforth SSC), databases for personal income in 1997, 2001, and 2003 have been compiled. 12 They are 5% representative samples from the respective populations of PIT payers, containing, for each taxpayer: gross income by source, social security contributions paid by the employer and employee (these are imputed), personal income tax paid, and the amounts of allowances and deductions. The following analysis draws upon these databases. Many other results of the research project are given in Čok and Urban (2005) .
The analysis of redistributive effect undertaken as part of that project showed that unequal treatments and rerankings caused by the PIT alone had a very limited effect, for example causing in 2003 a loss of under 3% of redistributive power. This was contrary to expectations, since the government had introduced 18 new PIT deductions between 2000 and 2002 -and additionally, the personal allowance for dependants had been raised. However, the loss of RE is somewhat higher if both the PIT and SSC are taken into consideration, as the results presented below will show. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that the SSC is not levied upon pensioners, who make up a significant portion of the observed population.
Pre-tax income X is defined as gross income before the PIT and SSC are imposed. Personal taxes T are given by the sum of the PIT and the SSC. We used income intervals ranging (on an annual basis) from 500 HRK to 5,000 HRK to define pre-tax close equals groups. The current exchange rate for the Croatian currency (the kuna) is EUR ≈ HRK 7.30 and USD ≈ 5.71 HRK. The average net monthly salary in Croatia is 4,000 HRK. Values for pre-and post-tax inequality and redistributive effect are not conditioned by the choice of bandwidth for close equals. We show these values for 2003, along with the vertical and reranking components of the Kakwani decomposition (which are also unaffected by the banding) in Table 6 . (9)- (10)), results now depend on the chosen bandwidth. Table 7 shows the relevant values, for various choices of the bandwidth, and expressed as percentages of either RE or R APK .
13 Figures 1 and 2 show the same information graphically.
Bandwidth in HRK 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000 4,500 5,000 We chose to calculate the decomposition components in MATLAB, using procedures which were purpose-built. Details are available on request from one of us (Urban). Notice that H is almost negligible as a percentage of RE for small bandwidths. The question of an optimal bandwidth for estimating the components in our decomposition (9) arises. For very large bandwidths, as Figure 1 shows, H is seriously underestimated, becoming large and negative. In van der Ven et al. (2001) , it is suggested that the "logical" choice of bandwidth would be the one that maximizes the vertical component of redistributive effect. However, this conclusion is linked to the VCL decomposition and not our (9), and would, if taken literally, involve maximizing V VCL and not V. In Figure 3 , we show all four vertical measures, V, V AJL , V WAG and V VCL , plotted against bandwidth for 2003. Clearly, the numerical differences can be very significant. From our Table 7 , a bandwidth of approximately 2000 HRK would maximize V as a percentage of RE. Then H ≈ 0.03% of RE. Another finding is that AJL-reranking accounts only for a part of total reranking, and this part decreases from 94.03 to 72.49% as the bandwidth is raised. Evidently, as the bandwidth is widened, within-groups reranking rises; 14 and as is to be expected, entire-groups reranking falls. In Figure 4 we show the changing compositions of RE and R APK over the period 1997-2003 covered by our data, for a bandwidth of 2000 HRK. 15 It is clear that the contribution of reranking R APK to redistributive effect decreases slightly in importance through time, and that, within R APK , there is a downward trend in R AJL .
14 From equation (8), we know the relationship between H AJL and R WG . Since H is very small, we may conclude that AJL's horizontal effect actually 'hides' the within-groups reranking within itself. 15 The median values of pre-tax income were approximately 23, 900 HRK, 26,900 HRK and 29,500 HRK in the years 1997 , 2001 , 2003 We cannot let it pass without comment that the empirical values of H for the Croatian tax system throughout the period 1997-2003 are exceedingly small, and approach zero as the bandwidth is reduced to zero (reflecting the lack of exact equals in our samples). On the other hand, even in the limit, we can still distinguish three kinds of reranking (refer back to Figure 2 ). The 'no reranking' approach to capturing tax inequity arose at least in part in response to the sparsity or lack of exact equals in sample data (if not in the population). Does Kakwani's decomposition RE = V K -R APK tell the whole story for such data, then? We conclude our examination of the redistributive properties of the Croatian PIT and SSC with a deeper consideration of the horizontal effect H. If a researcher gets such a small value for H, how can this be used in the meaningful description of tax system properties? One answer, perhaps, has been anticipated already in footnote 7: what would have been counted as HI before, when following the AJL approach, is now, in the fully developed measurement system, actually within-groups reranking. The tiny magnitudes of H may, of course, be particular to the Croatian data; for our illustrative data set, H amounted to 4.9% of RE. The main difference between the illustrative data and real empirical data lies in the number of groups. In Table 2 , the whole population was divided into only 6 groups, with consequently large intervals; in the empirical case, we have small intervals and many groups.
As an aside, we remark here that the horizontal effect according to our other measure, H AJL , and those that would be obtained by following the WAG and VCL adaptations of the AJL methodology, also become very small as the bandwidth shrinks, although they are very different, and also different from H, for larger bandwidths. See Figure 5 . It seems intuitive that, the larger the bandwidth, the greater will be the absolute deviations of post-tax incomes from the smoothed values. Although this is not (quite) what H measures, a small modification can make it so. If the concentration curves C 1 and C 5 cross, perhaps many times, 16 then there are areas for which C 1 is above C 5 , and vice versa. These areas may 'cancel' each other, leading to a net value for H that may be very small and either positive or negative. 
Conclusions
Following the impetus provided by the papers of Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) and , a number of authors have undertaken decompositions of redistributive effect into vertical, horizontal and reranking components. The 1994 papers laid out the appropriate (Gini-based) measurement theory for a model in which the pre-tax income distribution can be partitioned into exact pre-tax equals groups. The model assumes that the income tax system does not rerank equals groups; obviously it could not induce rerankings within equals groups (since all members of each group started equal). The methodology has, though, usually been applied in the context of close equals groups, not least because of the sparsity or absence of exact equals in typical sample data. When close equals groups are specified, typically it is found that reranking does occur within groups, and also entire groups may be reranked. The AJL methodology falls down in such a case, and needs to be rather carefully adapted.
In this paper, we have explained the careful modifications which must be made to the AJL measurement system when close equals groups are invoked by the practitioner. In the process, we have been able to finally reconcile a number of approaches to measuring equity in tax systems which have co-existed in the literature up until now, but have not been fitted into a unified framework. We refer principally to the approaches of Atkinson (1980) , Plotnick (1981) and Kakwani (1984 Kakwani ( , 1986 , but have also pointed to connections with the approaches of King (1983) and Jenkins (1988 Jenkins ( , 1994 .
The adaptations of the AJL measurement system we were required to make for close equals group analysis were several. First, any tax system can induce three different forms of reranking between and within close equals groups, only one of which is possible for groups of exact equals. The adaptation had to identify and disentangle all three forms of reranking. Second, the vertical stance of the tax is characterized by AJL in terms of the averaged tax, where the averaging is done post-tax within each group of exact pre-tax equals. For the close equals group scenario, we needed to formulate a different counterfactual tax, one which "smoothed" the actual effect of the tax within each close equals group, and use this to express the vertical stance of the actual tax. Finally, in the AJL measurement system, horizontal inequity is captured as post-tax inequality introduced among pretax equals. Whilst it was possible to adapt this directly, and measure horizontal inequity in terms of pre-and post-tax inequality comparisons group by group, a far more suitable adaptation for us, the one which allowed us to complete our measurement system, rested upon person-by-person comparisons of actual and smoothed post-tax incomes within close equals groups.
We explained the new measurement system fully by reference to the artificial dataset introduced in Section 2 to illustrate the three different forms of reranking that can be caused by a tax system when close equals groups are specified. Our recommendation for future users of the AJL approach is this. Having selected a bandwidth for close equals, decompose redistributive effect according to (9), RE = V -H -R APK , and use (3), R APK = R AJL + R WG + R EG , to ascertain the percentage contributions of each form of reranking.
19
Now repeat the calculations for different bandwidths, and either focus upon the one that maximizes V, or, better, produce plots that show the dependences of the various contributions upon the bandwidth selected. We have one further suggestion. This stems from our detailed analysis of the vertical, horizontal and reranking characteristics of the Croatian direct tax system using the new methodology. In the face of vanishingly small values for H, the analyst may have recourse to the "total horizontal inequity" measure H T , which we have also defined, to check whether canceling (of deviations of actual post-tax incomes from counterfactual ones, in close equals groups) is rendering the H value extremely small. 19 Once the terms in (9) and (3) have all been evaluated, V K can be computed from (10), and V AJL and H AJL from (7) and (8) respectively. Hence the terms in decompositions (9) and (3) contain all the information needed to arrive at the Kakwani (1984) and AJL decompositions given in (1) and (2), should these be desired. Between groups reranking affected these income units: #4, #5, #6, #7; #12, #13, #14, #15, #16; #18, #19; #20, #21, #23, #24, #25 Entire groups reranking affected these income units: #10, #11, #12, #13, #14, #15, #16, #17 AJL reranking affected these income units: #3, #5, #10, #11, #17, #19, #21 TABLE 1 
